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Rodger et al 1 present a thoughtful case for the ethical defensibility of genetic disenhancement targeting unnecessary harm and suffering of the pigs raised for xenotransplantation research. On the assumption that xenotransplantation research is unlikely to be halted (and by my lights, also that no other short-term palliative options can be identified or developed), their view appears to be largely reasonable and aligned with recent proposals by animal ethicists for targeting pain in factory-farmed animals.
Yet, despite their thoughtful responses to anticipated objections, the authors overlook an important class of recent harm-based objections grounded in the ethics of care. Drawing on recent work in animal ethics, I present a case for potential (a) care-based harms to pigs and (b) care-based harms to humans that are relevant to genetic disenhancement interventions of the sort these authors propose. I discuss each in turn below.
Harms to genetically disenhanced pigs
The first concern over care-based harm draws on Mark Rowlands’2 notion that at least some non-human animals may be considered moral subjects, even if they are not considered moral agents. Rowlands’ view is based on the positive capacities that many animals possess for sympathy, compassion, kindness, patience and tolerance, as well as negative capacities including malice, anger and …
Footnotes
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.