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Rodger et al 1 argue that ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it is demonstrated that’ the pain and suffering of donor pigs ‘cannot be eliminated by other means’. The phrase ‘genetic disenhancement’ refers to genetic manipulation that would produce an animal that is either less able or entirely unable to experience pain and suffering. (The phrase is euphemistic because, on one possible reading, it suggests the removal of an existing enhancement, rather than what it actually is, namely a diminishment relative to the species norm.)
The authors acknowledge that genetic ‘disenhancement’ is not a ‘morally ideal ‘solution’, but argue that ‘it is morally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available’ (p. 1).
In advancing this argument, they explicitly state that they make no assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible. They take no stand on that issue, which is beyond the scope of their paper. They assume only that ‘ (1) xenotransplantation research will inevitably continue and (2) causing pain and suffering requires sufficient justification’ (p. 1).
However, in the absence of an assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible, the authors have not established their …
Footnotes
Contributors DB is the sole author.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
↵The authors’ provision about the status quo, replicated here, does not fully embody the assumption that the practice ‘will inevitably continue’, but we can set that aside.
↵Some readers will note that whereas this argument contains four propositions, the authors’ argument contains five. However, that is because, in the author’s argument, the additional proposition—that is their proposition 4—infers only what was already stated in premise 3 of their argument.
↵There is an intermediate possibility, namely that disenhancement is the very condition that transforms xenotransplantation into the domain the morally permissible. In that case, describing xenotransplation using disenhancement as ‘morally better’, would be apt in one sense but not in another.