Article Text
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism—equality between non-disabled human adults—implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human—an attribute which fetuses have.
- Abortion - Induced
- Disabled Persons
- Embryos and Fetuses
- Moral Status
- Persons
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Data availability statement
Data sharing not applicable as no datasets generated and/or analysed for this study.
Footnotes
Contributors CM takes sole responsibility for the content of this article as guarantor.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
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