Article Text
Abstract
In my recent article, Pretending to care, I argue that a better understanding of non-doxastic attitudes could improve our understanding of deception in clinical practice. In an insightful and well-argued response, Colgrove highlights three problems with my account. For the sake of brevity, in this reply I focus on the first: that my definition of deception is implausible because it does not involve intention. Although I concede that my initial broad definition needs modification, I argue that it should not be modified by involving intention but by involving responsibility.
- Ethics- Medical
- Philosophy- Medical
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Footnotes
Contributors The author is responsible for all aspects of the article.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
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