Article Text
Statistics from Altmetric.com
I’m grateful to the commentators for their thoughtful and thought-provoking replies.
Psychiatric service-users often feel disempowered relative to a profession (psychiatry) and so sometimes enlist the aid of another profession (philosophy) to redress the balance. All well and good, but it is vital in this context not to set one’s critical faculties on one side. Although Dr Kious1 thinks that is just what I have done, what I was trying to do was to call a halt to the uncritical use of a piece of philosophy, the concept of testimonial injustice. It is a fine tool in many contexts, it is the newest tool in the …
Footnotes
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Epistemic injustice, children and mental illness
- Epistemic injustice in psychiatric practice: epistemic duties and the phenomenological approach
- Epistemic injustice in healthcare encounters: evidence from chronic fatigue syndrome
- Patients, clinicians and open notes: information blocking as a case of epistemic injustice
- Where is knowledge from the global South? An account of epistemic justice for a global bioethics
- Evidence, ethics and the promise of artificial intelligence in psychiatry
- From hermeneutics to heteroglossia: ‘The Patient’s View’ revisited
- Epistemic repair in global health: a human rights approach towards epistemic justice
- How to identify epistemic injustice in global health research funding practices: a decolonial guide
- Look for injustice and you’ll probably find it: a commentary on Harcourt’s ‘epistemic injustice, children and mental illness’