• Embryo Research

Assisted conception (assistance with the process of fusing an ovum with a sperm cell to form a zygote prior to pregnancy) can be distinguished from assisted gestation (assistance with the ‘generative process between conception and birth’).1 These processes have tended to be grouped together under the generic term assisted reproductive technology (ART) in the bioethical literature. According to Chloe Romanis, however, it is worth distinguishing interventions such as surrogacy, uterus transplantation (UTx), and potentially artificial placenta technology, as falling under the genus assisted gestative technologies (AGTs). This is because gestation carries unique ethico-legal implications as compared with conception.

The proposed genus of assisted gestative technologies is a helpful first step in the endeavour to distinguish between the different ethico-legal landscapes across various ‘assisted reproductive technologies.’ I am generally in favour of adopting AGT as a term which separates various forms of gestational services from other kinds of reproductive technologies. Yet, if assisted gestative technologies can be considered a genus of assisted reproductive technologies, we might consider surrogacy, UTx, and artificial placenta technology their individual species. Between these various species of AGTs, I would argue, there remains enough ethico-legal diversity to warrant independent discussion about the descriptive and normative functions of each AGT and the relationship between gestation, genetic relatedness and legal/moral parenthood.