This paper is a response to a recent paper by Bobier and Omelianchuk in which they argue that the critics of Giubilini and Minerva’s defence of infanticide fail to adequately justify a moral difference at birth. They argue that such arguments would lead to an intuitively less plausible position: that late-term abortions are permissible, thus creating a dilemma for those who seek to argue that birth matters. I argue that the only way to resolve this dilemma, is to bite the naturalist bullet and accept that the intuitively plausible idea that birth constitutes a morally relevant event is simply mistaken and biologically misinformed.
- applied and professional ethics
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Contributors WV is the sole author of this piece.
Funding This study was funded by "A Philosophy of Medicine for the 21st Century” (Ref: (FL170100160)).
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
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