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Flourishing is not a conception of dignity
- Correspondence to Dr Linda Barclay, Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia; linda.barclay{at}monash.edu
Citation
Flourishing is not a conception of dignity
Publication history
- Received October 26, 2022
- Accepted October 26, 2022
- First published November 16, 2022.
Online issue publication
November 28, 2022
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- Previous version (16 November 2022).
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© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
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