Article info
Editorial
Pragmatic argument for an acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements
- Correspondence to Professor Thomas Douglas, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK; thomas.douglas{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Citation
Pragmatic argument for an acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements
Publication history
- Received September 22, 2022
- Accepted September 26, 2022
- First published October 31, 2022.
Online issue publication
October 31, 2022
Request permissions
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Copyright information
© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
Other content recommended for you
- Can we learn from hidden mistakes? Self-fulfilling prophecy and responsible neuroprognostic innovation
- Grading quality of evidence and strength of recommendations for diagnostic tests and strategies
- Troponin I, laboratory issues, and clinical outcomes in a district general hospital: crossover study with “traditional” markers of myocardial infarction in a total of 1990 patients
- Guidance for the design and reporting of studies evaluating the clinical performance of tests for present or past SARS-CoV-2 infection
- Sense and sensitivity: can an inaccurate test be better than no test at all?
- Association between guideline adherence and clinical outcome for patients referred for diagnostic breast imaging
- Estimating misclassification error in a binary performance indicator: case study of low value care in Australian hospitals
- Exploring the impact of pulse oximeter selection within the COVID-19 home-use pulse oximetry pathways
- Competence for physician-assisted death of patients with mental disorders: theoretical and practical considerations
- AI, doping and ethics: On why increasing the effectiveness of detecting doping fraud in sport may be morally wrong