Article Text
Abstract
The longstanding dominant view is that health care practitioners should be permitted to refrain from participating in medical interventions when they have a conscientious objection to doing so in a broad range of cases. In recent years, a growing minority have been fervently advocating a sea change. In their view, medical professionals should not be permitted to refuse to participate in medical interventions merely because doing so conflicts with their own moral or religious views. One of the most commonly offered arguments in support of this position focuses on the fact that health care practitioners knew what they were getting into when they voluntarily chose to take on their professional roles; nobody forced them to do this. I will argue that, despite its popularity among opponents of conscientious refusal, this argument from voluntariness fails to provide us with a good reason to reject broad accommodationism in favour of non-accommodationism.
- conscientious objection
- applied and professional ethics
- codes of/position statements on professional ethics
- interests of health personnel/institutions
- religious ethics
Data availability statement
No data are available. NA.
Statistics from Altmetric.com
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Non-accommodationism and conscientious objection in healthcare: a response to Robinson
- Conscientious objection and the referral requirement as morally permissible moral mistakes
- Conscientious objection in healthcare, referral and the military analogy
- When should conscientious objection be accepted?
- Conscientious objection in healthcare: new directions
- Professional and conscience-based refusals: the case of the psychiatrist's harmful prescription
- Questionable benefits and unavoidable personal beliefs: defending conscientious objection for abortion
- Conscientious objection in healthcare: why tribunals might be the answer
- Conscientious objection in healthcare and the duty to refer
- Public reason and the limited right to conscientious objection: a response to Magelssen