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Fine-tuning the impairment argument
- Correspondence to Bruce Philip Blackshaw, Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; bblackshaw{at}gmail.com
Citation
Fine-tuning the impairment argument
Publication history
- Received September 15, 2020
- Revised October 5, 2020
- Accepted October 12, 2020
- First published November 10, 2020.
Online issue publication
August 23, 2021
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- Previous version (10 November 2020).
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© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
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