Article info
PDFOriginal research
Strengthening the impairment argument against abortion
- Correspondence to Bruce Philip Blackshaw, Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; bblackshaw{at}gmail.com
Citation
Strengthening the impairment argument against abortion
Publication history
- Received February 17, 2020
- Revised May 6, 2020
- Accepted May 15, 2020
- First published June 5, 2020.
Online issue publication
June 24, 2021
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© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
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