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Defending the distinction between pregnancy and parenthood
  1. Prabhpal Singh1,2
  1. 1 University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
  2. 2 Ronin Institute, Montclair, New Jersey, USA
  1. Correspondence to Mr Prabhpal Singh, Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada; p248singh{at}


In this paper, I respond to the criticisms towards my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent–child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclude the raised criticisms do not amount to a stron philosophical case against my account.

  • embryos and fetuses
  • moral status
  • infanticide
  • abortion
  • philosophical ethics

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  • Contributors Prabhpal Singh is the Sole Author.

  • Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Patient consent for publication Not required.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.

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