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Parental responsibilities and moral status
  1. Bruce Philip Blackshaw1,
  2. Daniel Rodger2
  1. 1 Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
  2. 2 Allied Health Sciences, London South Bank University School of Health and Social Care, London, UK
  1. Correspondence to Mr Bruce Philip Blackshaw, Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; bblackshaw{at}gmail.com

Abstract

Prabhpal Singh has recently defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns as a way of explaining why abortion is permissible and infanticide is not. He claims that only a newborn can stand in a parent–child relation, not a fetus, and this relation has a moral dimension that bestows moral value. We challenge Singh’s reasoning, arguing that the case he presents is unconvincing. We suggest that the parent–child relation is better understood as an extension of an existing relationship formed during the gestational period. The change in this relation at birth is not sufficient to justify the radical change in moral status required to rule out infanticide while accepting the permissibility of abortion. Given that the moral status of orphans is also problematic under Singh’s account, we conclude that Singh has not shown that a newborn has greater moral worth than a fetus.

  • abortion
  • infanticide
  • moral status
  • embryos and fetuses
  • newborns and minors

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Footnotes

  • Twitter @philosowhal

  • Contributors BPB wrote the introduction and the following two sections. DR suggested the response, wrote the third section and edited the entire paper.

  • Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Patient consent for publication Not required.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.

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