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Strengthened impairment argument: restating Marquis?
  1. Alex Gillham
  1. Department of Philosophy, Saint Bonaventure University, Saint Bonaventure, New York, USA
  1. Correspondence to Dr Alex Gillham, Department of Philosophy, Saint Bonaventure University, Saint Bonaventure, NY 14778, USA; argillham{at}


Blackshaw and Hendricks recently developed a strengthened version of the impairment argument (SIA) that imports Marquis’ account of the wrongness of abortion. I then argued that if SIA imports Marquis’ account, then it restates Marquis’ position and thus is not very significant. In turn, Blackshaw and Hendricks explained why they take SIA to be importantly different from Marquis’ account. I have two aims in this response. First, I reconstruct Blackshaw and Hendricks’ arguments for the claim that SIA is importantly different from Marquis’ account. Second, I argue that SIA is not importantly different from Marquis’ account in the respect that Blackshaw and Hendricks take it to be.

  • ethics
  • applied and professional ethics
  • abortion

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  • Contributors AG is the sole contributor to this submission.

  • Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

  • Competing interests None declared.

  • Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

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