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Technological moral enhancement or traditional moral progress? Why not both?
- Correspondence to Dr Joao Fabiano, Department of Philosophy, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil; jlafabiano{at}gmail.com
Citation
Technological moral enhancement or traditional moral progress? Why not both?
Publication history
- Received October 24, 2019
- Revised February 11, 2020
- Accepted March 11, 2020
- First published March 30, 2020.
Online issue publication
May 29, 2020
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- Previous version (30 March 2020).
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© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.
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