Article Text
Abstract
In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, I argued that Marquis’ argument about abortion encounters the Epicurean Challenge. In this essay, I continue the conversation begun there. I aim to motivate the Challenge further by examining Marquis’ argument on his own terms and responding to objections about whom death deprives, whether we should focus on the action of killing or the result of death, and how harms suffered before existence compare to harms suffered after death. Finally, I suggest that perhaps the solution to the ethics of killing lies in considering another account of harm entirely—one that does not rely on deprivation.
- abortion
- death
- ethics
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Footnotes
Contributors I, AC, am the sole author of this document.
Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
Patient consent for publication Not required.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
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