Article Text
Statistics from Altmetric.com
The four thoughtful commentaries on our feature article draw out interesting empirical and normative questions. The aim of our study was to examine the views of a sample of the general public about a set of cases of disputed treatment for severely impaired infants.1 We compared those views with legal determinations that treatment was or was not in the infants’ best interests, and with some published ethical frameworks for decisions. We deliberately did not draw explicit ethical conclusions from our survey findings, both because of the acknowledged limitations of survey methodology, and because survey conclusions cannot, in themselves, yield answers about what the right threshold should be for providing or withholding treatment.2
In this brief response, we are going to address head-on the important ethical question raised within our survey – when life is worth living for an infant. We follow-up on the suggestion of two commentators that the presence or absence of “relational potential” might be ethically important to report in studies of the outcome of severely impaired infants,3 and to whether parental requests for treatment should be supported.4
The notion of “relational potential” was introduced by John Arras in a 1984 commentary.5 Arras was responding to the Baby Doe Regulations and a …
Footnotes
Twitter @Neonatalethics
Funding JS was supported for this work by grants from the Wellcome trust WT106587/Z/14/Z, WT203132/Z/16/Z.
Competing interests None declared.
Patient consent for publication Not required.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
↵We do not want to claim that biological life below the relational threshold has zero value. Such individuals might have some positive wellbeing. Rather, the idea is that this is a threshold for a particular (and important) kind of value to be realised.
↵In some philosophical contexts, ’self-consciousness’ is taken to refer to a fairly high-level capacity — such as having a concept of self. It’s something that no infant has, even if perfectly normal. But we take it that that high-level capacity is not really necessary for a minimal two-way relationship (and suggest that normal newborn infants do have relational capacity).
Linked Articles
- Feature article
- Commentary
- Commentary
- Commentary
- Commentary
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Medical ethics for children: applying the four principles to paediatrics
- The patient's journey: Living with locked-in syndrome
- Is it in the best interests of an intellectually disabled infant to die?
- Is there such a thing as a life not worth living?
- The best interest standard and children: clarifying a concept and responding to its critics
- Proceeding with clinical trials of animal to human organ transplantation: a way out of the dilemma
- Disability matters in medical law
- Which newborn infants are too expensive to treat? Camosy and rationing in intensive care
- Consent and end of life decisions
- The best interests test at the end of life on PICU: a plea for a family centred approach