Article info
PDFThe concise argument
What sort of person could have a radically extended lifespan?
- Correspondence to Dr Rebecca Roache, Department of Philosophy, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, TW20 0EX, UK; rebecca.roache{at}royalholloway.ac.uk
Citation
What sort of person could have a radically extended lifespan?
Publication history
- First published March 22, 2018.
Online issue publication
March 23, 2018
Request permissions
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Copyright information
© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.
Other content recommended for you
- Life-extending enhancements and the narrative approach to personal identity
- Withering Minds: towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia
- Advance directives in psychiatric care: a narrative approach
- Non-voluntary BCI explantation: assessing possible neurorights violations in light of contrasting mental ontologies
- Propranolol, post-traumatic stress disorder and narrative identity
- Pump, person and Parfit: why the constitutive heart matters
- Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’
- Proxy consent: moral authority misconceived
- Should we enhance animals?
- What sort of death matters?