Article Text

PDF
Messy autonomy: Commentary on Patient preference predictors and the problem of naked statistical evidence
  1. Stephen David John
  1. Correspondence to Dr Stephen David John, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK; sdj22{at}cam.ac.uk

Statistics from Altmetric.com

Like many, I find the idea of relying on patient preference predictors (PPP) in life-or-death cases ethically troubling. As part of his stimulating discussion, Sharadin1 diagnoses such unease as a worry that using PPPs disrespects patients’ autonomy, by treating their most intimate and significant desires as if they were caused by their demographic traits. I agree entirely with Sharadin’s ‘debunking’ response to this concern: we can use statistical correlations to predict others’ preferences without thereby assuming any causal claim (although I am worried that blocking the conversational implicatures may be far harder in emotionally charged life-and-death contexts than at dinner parties). However, I suspect that, for at least some of us, our unease about PPPs stems from a different kind of ‘autonomy’ concern. In this commentary, then, I will explore this concern, and show how it relates to Sharadin’s work.

Very many of our preferences are caused, ultimately, by facts which are outside our control, such as our demographic features. However, I suggest that we can still act autonomously on the basis of such preferences, when they are preferences which we endorse. Imagine, for example, that Jane has grown up in a church-growing environment, which has shaped many of her preferences, …

View Full Text

Request Permissions

If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.

Linked Articles