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Abstract
In his excellent essay, ‘Nudges in a post-truth world’, Neil Levy argues that ‘nudges to reason’, or nudges which aim to make us more receptive to evidence, are morally permissible. A strong argument against the moral permissibility of nudging is that nudges fail to respect the autonomy of the individuals affected by them. Levy argues that nudges to reason do respect individual autonomy, such that the standard autonomy objection fails against nudges to reason. In this paper, I argue that Levy fails to show that nudges to reason respect individual autonomy.
- ethics
- political science
- public policy
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Footnotes
Contributors GK is the sole author of this work.
Funding Arts and Humanities Research Council (South, West and Wales Doctoral Training Partnership PhD Studentship).
Competing interests None declared.
Provenance and peer review Commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
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