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Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection
- Correspondence to Xavier Symons, University of Notre Dame Australia, Institute for Ethics and Society, L1, 104 Broadway (PO Box 944), Broadway, Sydney NSW 2007, Australia; xavier.symons{at}nd.edu.au, symons.xavier{at}gmail.com
Citation
Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection
Publication history
- Received May 24, 2016
- Revised July 14, 2016
- Accepted August 15, 2016
- First published September 9, 2016.
Online issue publication
March 22, 2017
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- Previous version (9 September 2016).
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