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Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection
  1. Correspondence to Xavier Symons, University of Notre Dame Australia, Institute for Ethics and Society, L1, 104 Broadway (PO Box 944), Broadway, Sydney NSW 2007, Australia; xavier.symons{at}nd.edu.au, symons.xavier{at}gmail.com
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Symons X
Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection

Publication history

  • Received May 24, 2016
  • Revised July 14, 2016
  • Accepted August 15, 2016
  • First published September 9, 2016.
Online issue publication 
March 22, 2017

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