The welfarist account of enhancement and disability holds enhanced and disabled states on a spectrum: the former are biological or psychological states that increase the chances of a person leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances, while the latter decrease those chances. Here, I focus on a particular issue raised by this account: what should we count as part of an individual's relevant set of circumstances when thinking about enhanced and disabled states? Specifically, is social prejudice relevant to an individual's circumstances in regards to how disabled or enhanced they are? For instance, if an individual is discriminated against on the basis of their skin colour, and this leads to a reduction in their well-being, the welfarist account suggests that their skin colour is a disability. To avoid such a seeming mislabel, Savulescu and Kahane have argued for excluding social prejudice from counting as a relevant circumstance to their welfarist definition of disability. I argue, however, that this exclusion of social prejudice is unsatisfactory and incompatible with the goals of this account.
- Philosophical Ethics
Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Graphic illustration of impairment: science fiction, Transmetropolitan and the social model of disability
- Making space for disability studies within a structurally competent medical curriculum: reflections on long Covid
- Is there a coherent social conception of disability?
- Disability and difference: balancing social and physical constructions
- Disability and narrative: new directions for medicine and the medical humanities
- Disability assessment medicine
- Disability, gene therapy and eugenics - a challenge to John Harris
- Principles of neurological rehabilitation
- Externalist argument against medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness
- Philosophy meets disability