Curtis B, Vehmas S. A Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability. J Med Ethics 2016;42:41–5.

A section of text is missing from the article at page 43, the correct text should state:

In a common interpretation of what Moore is up to here, first championed by William Lycan [reference 11], Moore is making a simple dialectical move against the sceptic. In order to see what this is, consider a typical sceptical argument for the conclusion that we do not know that we have hands:

• Premise 1. If S knows that S has hands, then S knows that all propositions incompatible with S knowing that S has hands are false.

• Premise 2. S does not know that all propositions incompatible with S knowing that S hands are false, as the proposition that the external world exists is such a proposition, and S does not know that this proposition is false.

Conclusion: S does not know that S has hands.

Instead of:

In a common interpretation of what Moore is up to here, first championed by Lycan [reference 11] Moore is making a simple dialectical move against the sceptic. In order to see what this is, consider a typical sceptical argument for the conclusion that we do not know that we have hands.