Article Text

Download PDFPDF
What makes death bad for us?

Statistics from

Request Permissions

If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.


  • Competing interests None.

  • Provenance and peer review Commissioned; internally peer reviewed.

  • i DeGrazia and I agree that ‘the best possible subjective theory is more plausible than any objective theory’ (p. 112) of what makes things go well for us, or our well-being, but we may differ over what the best subjective theory is. In opposition to what I hold, he claims: ‘If the satisfaction of an informed desire does not give us any felt satisfaction, it is unclear why it should count as valuable on a subjective account’ (p. 110). On the other hand, he insists: ‘A person's happiness makes her well-off only if it based on a more or less accurate understanding of her circumstances’ (p. 114). But why, when it's having this basis clearly isn't anything felt? So, the precise difference between our views eludes me. It may in part have to do with the fact that I take the relevant notion to be ‘what makes things go well/have intrinsic value for us’ which I take to be broader than the experientially-tinged ‘our well-being’, whereas he seems guided by the latter notion.

Linked Articles

  • Author meets critics: precis
    David DeGrazia
  • Author meets critics: response
    David Benatar
  • Author meets critics: response
    Leslie Francis
  • Author meets critics: response
    Sheelagh McGuinness
  • Author meets critics: response
    David DeGrazia

Other content recommended for you