Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Although Saghai primarily focuses on distinguishing nudges from other forms of influence, ‘Salvaging the Concept of Nudge’ offers a definition of nudges that could blunt much of the moral criticism of nudging and clarify debates about specific policies.1 The definition he offers, however, restricts the class of nudges to include only those influences that counter an individual's preferences; thus, contrary to what Thaler and Sunstein say, nudges cannot be instances of libertarian paternalism.1 ,2
According to Saghai, ‘A nudges B when A makes it more likely that B will ϕ, primarily by triggering B's shallow cognitive processes, while A's influence preserves B's choice-set and is substantially non-controlling (i.e., preserves B's freedom of choice)’. Because the second condition—the substantial non-control condition—is supposed to ensure that nudges preserve freedom in a robust sense, this condition warrants careful attention.
According to Saghai, A's influence is substantially non-controlling ‘when B could easily not ϕ if she did not want to ϕ’. To determine whether a particular influence constitutes a nudge, we must ask whether from B's perspective that influence is easily resistible. …
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
- Feature article
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Salvaging the concept of nudge
- The concept of nudge and its moral significance: a reply to Ashcroft, Bovens, Dworkin, Welch and Wertheimer
- Incentives, equity and the Able Chooser Problem
- Commitment devices: beyond the medical ethics of nudges
- The challenges and opportunities of ‘nudging’
- Lying and nudging
- Why high-risk, non-expected-utility-maximising gambles can be rational and beneficial: the case of HIV cure studies
- Should ‘nudge’ be salvaged?
- To nudge or not to nudge: cancer screening programmes and the limits of libertarian paternalism
- Patient preferences for venous thromboembolism prophylaxis after injury: a discrete choice experiment