Article Text
Response
Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva
Abstract
In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.
- Abortion
- Allowing Minors to Die
Statistics from Altmetric.com
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’
- Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility
- Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth
- Of course the baby should live: against ‘after-birth abortion’
- Abortion, infanticide and moral context
- Birth, meaningful viability and abortion
- Personhood, harm and interest: a reply to Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva
- The pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ movement? Reflections on the Kermit Gosnell controversy
- Philosophy, critical thinking and ‘after-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’
- After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?