In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.
- Allowing Minors to Die
Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’
- Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility
- Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth
- Of course the baby should live: against ‘after-birth abortion’
- Abortion, infanticide and moral context
- Birth, meaningful viability and abortion
- Personhood, harm and interest: a reply to Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva
- The pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ movement? Reflections on the Kermit Gosnell controversy
- Philosophy, critical thinking and ‘after-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’
- After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?