Article Text
Response
Mini-symposium on after-birth abortion
The performativity of personhood
Statistics from Altmetric.com
In debates on infanticide, including the recent defence of so-called ‘after-birth abortion’, philosophers generally treat the term ‘the person’ as descriptive, such that statements claiming that something is a person (or not) can be considered true or false, depending on the characteristics of that thing. This obscures important aspects of its usage. J L Austen identified a subset of speech acts as performative, in that they do things in their very declaration or utterance. They do not simply describe states of affairs or things, but perform the act they ostensibly describe. ‘I promise’ or ‘I apologise’ may be taken as paradigmatic. Performative speech acts are not judged according to their truth-value, but their …
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility
- Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’
- Personhood, harm and interest: a reply to Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva
- Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva
- Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood
- Abortion, infanticide and moral context
- Clinicians’ criteria for fetal moral status: viability and relationality, not sentience
- Of course the baby should live: against ‘after-birth abortion’
- Philosophy, critical thinking and ‘after-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’
- Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth