Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Because a newborn baby does not have sufficiently complex psychological capacities to have a concept of continuation of (its) life, according to Tooley, it cannot desire continuation of (its) life, and thus cannot have a right to it.1 A similar position has been advocated by Kuhse and Singer2 ,3—and, more recently, by Giubilini and Minerva.4
Key assumptions of Tooley are that (1) being able to desire something is a necessary condition of having a right to it and (2) having a concept of something is a necessary condition of being able to desire it. Despite their plausibility, these premises are at least open to question—that is, these are things that there can presumably be reasonable disagreement about. I …
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’
- Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva
- Abortion, infanticide and moral context
- Is there a ‘new ethics of abortion’?
- After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?
- Of course the baby should live: against ‘after-birth abortion’
- Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility
- Critical notice—Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice by Francis J Beckwith
- Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth
- Philosophy, critical thinking and ‘after-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’