Article Text
PDFPublic policy
The fragility of freedom of speech
Abstract
Freedom of speech is a fundamental liberty that imposes a stringent duty of tolerance. Tolerance is limited by direct incitements to violence. False notions and bad laws on speech have obscured our view of this freedom. Hence, perhaps, the self-righteous intolerance, incitements and threats in response to Giubilini and Minerva. Those who disagree have the right to argue back but their attempts to shut us up are morally wrong.
- Allowing Minors to Die
- Legal Aspects
- Legal Philosophy
- Philosophical Ethics
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