Article info
PDFThe argument
Paper
The common premise for uncommon conclusions
- Correspondence to Professor C A J Coady, Department of Philosophy, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia; t.coady{at}unimelb.edu.au
Citation
The common premise for uncommon conclusions
Publication history
- Received October 17, 2012
- Accepted November 29, 2012
- First published May 1, 2013.
Online issue publication
May 01, 2013
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