Article info
PDFThe argument
Infanticide and moral consistency
- Correspondence to Professor Jeff McMahan, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA; mcmahan{at}philosophy.rutgers.edu
Citation
Infanticide and moral consistency
Publication history
- Received July 30, 2012
- Revised August 2, 2012
- Accepted November 29, 2012
- First published May 1, 2013.
Online issue publication
May 01, 2013
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