Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Jeremy Bentham, protesting against the cruelty of inflicting the death penalty on mothers who kill their newborn infants, described infanticide as the killing of a being ‘who has ceased to be, before knowing what existence is.’ He also pointed out that is an offence ‘of a nature not to give the slightest inquietude to the most timid imagination,’ for all those who come to learn of the offence are themselves too old to be threatened by it.1 These points still hold true, and also apply to abortion. They do not, of course, enable one to conclude that there is nothing wrong with either abortion or infanticide, but they do suggest a plausible ground for thinking that these acts should not be thought of as morally equivalent to the murder of beings who are capable of ‘knowing what existence is’ and of learning that beings like them can be, and sometimes are, killed.
Michael Tooley initiated the discussion of infanticide in contemporary applied ethics in his article Abortion and infanticide published in Philosophy and Public Affairs …
↵ i This comment draws on remarks published in The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 15, 2012.
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva
- Of course the baby should live: against ‘after-birth abortion’
- Abortion, infanticide and moral context
- Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility
- Limitations on personhood arguments for abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’
- Infanticide: a reply to Giubilini and Minerva
- Dilemma for appeals to the moral significance of birth
- The moral significance of being born
- The pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ movement? Reflections on the Kermit Gosnell controversy
- Personhood, harm and interest: a reply to Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva