Article info
PDFFeature article
Why is it possible to enhance moral status and why doing so is wrong?
- Correspondence to Dr Nicholas Agar, Victoria University of Wellington, Philosophy Program, PO Box 600, Wellington 6140, New Zealand; nicholas.agar{at}vuw.ac.nz
Citation
Why is it possible to enhance moral status and why doing so is wrong?
Publication history
- Received February 23, 2012
- Accepted July 20, 2012
- First published August 24, 2012.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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