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What's wrong with enhancements?
- Correspondence to Professor Larry S Temkin, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1107, USA; ltemkin{at}rci.rutgers.edu
Citation
What's wrong with enhancements?
Publication history
- Received September 12, 2012
- Accepted September 20, 2012
- First published November 9, 2012.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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