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Genetic Enhancement, Post-persons, and Moral Status: Author reply to commentaries
- Correspondence to Dr. David DeGrazia, Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, 801 22nd Street, N.W. Room 525, Washington, DC 20052, USA; ddd{at}gwu.edu
Citation
Genetic Enhancement, Post-persons, and Moral Status: Author reply to commentaries
Publication history
- Accepted November 17, 2011
- First published December 17, 2011.
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April 27, 2016
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© 2012, Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
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