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PDFFeature article
Genetic enhancement, post-persons and moral status: a reply to Buchanan
- Correspondence to David DeGrazia, Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, 801 22nd Street, N.W. Room 525, Washington, DC 20052, USA; ddd{at}gwu.edu
Citation
Genetic enhancement, post-persons and moral status: a reply to Buchanan
Publication history
- Accepted July 15, 2011
- First published November 10, 2011.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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© 2012, Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
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