• Enhancement
• Philosophical Ethics

Nicholas Agar argues1 that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this could harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. Agar calls the enhanced people ‘posthumans’, but I would like to avoid this term because it implies that the enhanced people do not belong to the human species. If the enhancement consists in the enhancement of properties, such as intelligence, moral capacity, beauty, health and so on, I do not see why the enhanced cannot be members of Homo sapiens, though I do not think that it makes any moral difference whether or not they would belong to the human species.2 I prefer to speak of super-persons, since the properties enhanced are to a large extent properties that are constitutive of personhood. This is true of moral capacity, the enhancement of which I am particularly concerned about, because in publications coauthored with Julian Savulescu I have argued for the need or desirability of moral enhancement.3

Agar's argument is that if super-persons/posthumans come into existence then those of us who have chosen to remain human, or have had no option but to, may find the significance of our interests significantly diminished. Posthuman wannabees … want to create circumstance in which our interests, and the interests of our human children, are morally subordinated to their own interests or to their posthuman descendants. I think that we are entitled to prevent them from doing this. Those who choose to radically enhance themselves or their offspring may defend this choice as an expression of freedom over the state of their own bodies and brains or over the brains and bodies of their offspring. I have shown that it cannot be regarded as a purely self-regarding choice. It has potentially disastrous consequences for the moral standing of those who do not make similar choices (see page 177 of Agar1).

If Agar is right, that enhancing oneselfⁱ ‘cannot be regarded as a purely self-regarding choice’, but ‘has potentially disastrous consequences for the moral standing of those who do not make similar choices’, it seems that it cannot be defended by reference to JS Mill's famous principle of liberty which is to the effect that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (see page 9 of Mill4).

However, a familiar problem with Mill's principle is that if any kind of harm to others could suffice to justify coercion, the principle will turn out to be very restrictive indeed, since most actions could harm others in one way or another. For instance, if you beat others in a fair competition, you may harm them because it would have been better for them to win. It seems clear, then, that for the principle to be plausible we need a distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm: it is only the latter which could justify restricting someone's freedom.

But what is morally impermissible harm? One suggestion is that it is harm which results from the violation of some right. It is plausible to claim that common sense morality features a theory of negative rights, rights to non-interference with our life, limb and property. This is rights of a sort classically defended by John Locke.5 The suggestion could be that it is harm which is due to the infringement of such rights which morally justifies interference from the state or other people. Suppose that you are training so hard that you will subsequently defeat me in a fair competition and, thereby, harm my interests. Then it would not be morally permissible for me—or anyone else—to interfere with your training for the reason that it will lead to me being harmed. This is for the reason that, according to this rights theory, I do not have a right or claim against you that you do not beat me in a fair competition; the harm you cause me then is morally permissible. By contrast, if you were training to beat me up in the future, I would be supplied with a reason to interfere with your training if I would later be unable to defend myself, since I have a right against you that you do not beat me up, so this way of harming is morally impermissible.

It would, however, seem that a utilitarian like Mill cannot consistently appeal to a theory of rights. Nevertheless, there is some textual evidence suggesting that he does appeal to rights. For instance, he writes that there are ‘certain interests which either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding ought to be considered rights’ (see page 73 of Mill4). But more straightforwardly utilitarian ways of drawing the distinction between permissible and impermissible harm are also available. For instance, it could be proposed that if, and only if, the harm to others is severe, it outweighs the harm of constraining freedom. The point in the present context is however, just, that advocates of Mill's principle of liberty need to supplement it with a clause which distinguishes between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm, and declares that only the latter is an admissible ground for interference; otherwise the principle becomes much too restrictive.

With this in mind, let us turn back to Agar's argument and the ‘potentially disastrous consequences’ of enhancement for the unenhanced—is this morally permissible or impermissible harm? Agar writes The arguments I have explored… do not denigrate the moral worth of posthumans. Quite the reverse, in fact. They address their possible moral superiority. I allow that, should posthumans come into existence, humans may have to concede that their enhanced experiential capacities make it right that we suffer to promote their welfare (see page 176 of Agar1).

The phrase ‘their enhanced experiential capacities make it right that we suffer to promote their welfare’ (my emphasis) makes it clear that the harm inflicted upon humans could be morally permissible. To illustrate what he has in mind, Agar supposes that a utilitarianism of a kind that Peter Singer has championed is the correct moral theory (see page 164–71 of Agar1).ⁱⁱ Agar correctly notes that, although Singer is known for his defence of the moral status of non-human animals, his utilitarianism requires him to sacrifice animal life to save human life if this maximizes utility. This is likely to be the case, since in view of their more sophisticated psychological faculties and longer life span, human lives will usually contain more utility than the life of any non-human animal. Analogously, Agar contends, in view of ‘their enhanced experiential capacities’ and longer life span, the lives of super-persons would on average contain more utility than human lives. So, in situations in which there was a choice between saving the life of a super-person and the life of an unenhanced human person, the super-person would as a rule have priority. In short, according to utilitarianism, unenhanced humans would have lower moral status than super-persons, for the same reason as even our closest animal relatives, chimpanzees, have a lower moral status than us.

The important point to notice here is that such harm to humans that could issue from their lower moral status relative to super-persons would be, on Agar's own admission, morally permissible harm, harm that super-persons could permissibly inflict upon humans, on the basis of the utilitarian morality assumed to be correct. Note that the parallel between super-persons and unenhanced humans, on the one hand, and humans and animals, on the other, can be misleading. It is true that humans could permissibly put their own interests before the interests of non-human animals, but it is also true that much—I would say, most—of the harm that humans cause animals is not morally justifiable. It is not utility maximising, but rather motivated by the speciesist prejudice that animal harm counts for less simply in virtue of not being human harm. Super-persons, being morally enhanced, are less likely to make such moral mistakes. When they inflict harm on humans, it is more likely to be morally permissible, that is, compatible with the goal of utility maximisation (which we are assuming is the true moral goal).

Now, as we have seen, the fact that some activity will bring harm to you provides you with a moral reason to stop this activity if this harm is morally impermissible, but not if it is morally permissible. If the harm is impermissible, you are permitted to use means to prevent the activity that you would not otherwise—if the harm was permissible or if the activity was non-harmful—be permitted to use. You are not permitted to use any means to prevent the threatening harm—not means that inflict a disproportionate amount of harm on the agent. But if you comply with this condition, you are engaging in permissible self-defence. However, if the activity will issue in harm being permissibly inflicted on you, you do not have a moral reason to stop the activity that you would not have had if it had been harmless to you. Morally permissible harm to you does not provide you with a moral justification for interference.

However, Agar seems to overlook the crucial distinction between morally permissible and impermissible harm. This becomes apparent when he writes that when we legitimately prevent humans from having posthuman offspring or transforming themselves into posthumans by pointing toward negative consequences for those who choose not to follow this path… Our reasoning is essentially the same as that used to prevent humans from transforming themselves into psychopaths (see page 174 of Agar1).

Nevertheless, the harm we risk exposing ourselves to if we allow people transforming themselves into psychopaths is likely to be of the morally impermissible kind, since psychopaths are known for having no understanding of or regard for morality. However, if we are proposing ‘a ban on varieties of enhancement judged injurious to others’ (see page 174 of Agar1), we must be alert to the distinction between morally permissible and impermissible injury. We cannot legitimately ban enhancement because it causes morally permissible injury to others; such injury does not provide us with a moral reason for interference. As remarked, Mill's principle of liberty needs to be qualified by a clause ruling out permissible harm to others as a legitimate ground for interference. Therefore, Agar's argument in favour of a permission to prevent the development of super-persons fails. If super-persons would harm unenhanced humans, it is likely to be in morally permissible ways, since we have assumed that their enhancement includes moral enhancement.