Article Text
Abstract
The value of conscience in healthcare ethics is widely debated. While some sources present it as an unquestionably positive attribute, others question both the veracity of its decisions and the effect of conscientious objection on patient access to health care. This paper argues that the right to object conscientiously should be broadened, subject to certain previsos, as there are many benefits to healthcare practice in the development of the consciences of practitioners. While effects such as the preservation of moral integrity are widely considered to benefit practitioners, this paper draws on the work of Hannah Arendt to offer several original arguments in defence of conscience that may more directly benefit patients, namely that a pang of conscience may be useful in rapidly unfolding situations in which there is no time to reflect satisfactorily upon activities and that, given the hierarchical nature of healthcare institutions, a right to defy authority on the basis of conscience may benefit junior staff who lack the institutional power to challenge the orders of superiors.
- Clinical ethics
- conscience
- consciousness
- legal aspects
- philosophical ethics
- philosophy of the health professions
Statistics from Altmetric.com
Footnotes
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Linked Articles
- The concise argument
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Conscientious objection in healthcare, referral and the military analogy
- Non-accommodationism and conscientious objection in healthcare: a response to Robinson
- Questionable benefits and unavoidable personal beliefs: defending conscientious objection for abortion
- Voluntarily chosen roles and conscientious objection in health care
- Conscientious objection in healthcare: why tribunals might be the answer
- Conscientious objection in healthcare: new directions
- When should conscientious objection be accepted?
- Conscientious objection in healthcare and the duty to refer
- Conscientious objection and the referral requirement as morally permissible moral mistakes
- Response to: ‘Why medical professionals have no moral claim to conscientious objection accommodation in liberal democracies’ by Schuklenk and Smalling