Article info
Teaching and learning ethics
Paper
Does the rejection of wrongful life claims rely on a conceptual error?
- Correspondence to Paul Mũtuanyingĩ Mũrĩithi, CESP/iSEI/School of Law, University of Manchester, Williamson Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK; paul.muriithi{at}postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
Citation
Does the rejection of wrongful life claims rely on a conceptual error?
Publication history
- Accepted December 21, 2010
- First published February 8, 2011.
Online issue publication
June 17, 2011
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- Previous version (8 February 2011).
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© 2011, Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
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