According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness of killing exist. I show that those alternative accounts are unsatisfactory.
- Philosophical ethics
- philosophy of medicine,quality/value of life/personhood
- mentally diasbled persons
Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Reply to Marquis: how things stand with the ‘future like ours’ argument
- Savulescu’s objections to the future of value argument
- Deprivations, futures and the wrongness of killing
- Reply to Di Nucci: why the counterexamples succeed
- Abortion and human nature
- Abortion: Strong’s counterexamples fail
- A future like ours revisited
- A critique of “the best secular argument against abortion”
- A defence of the potential future of value theory
- On how to interpret the role of the future within the abortion debate