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Response
Moral duties and euthanasia: why to kill is not necessarily the same as to let die
- Correspondence to Professor Hugh McLachlan, School of Law and Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK; h.mclachlan{at}gcu.ac.uk
Citation
Moral duties and euthanasia: why to kill is not necessarily the same as to let die
Publication history
- Received April 26, 2011
- Revised June 8, 2011
- Accepted June 10, 2011
- First published June 27, 2011.
Online issue publication
November 21, 2011
Article Versions
- Previous version (27 June 2011).
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© 2011, Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
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