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PDFGlobal medical ethics
Synthetic biology and the ethics of knowledge
- Correspondence to Dr Thomas Douglas, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Suite 8, Littlegate House, 16/17 St Ebbe's Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; thomas.douglas{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Citation
Synthetic biology and the ethics of knowledge
Publication history
- Received June 9, 2010
- Accepted June 9, 2010
- First published October 8, 2010.
Online issue publication
October 21, 2010
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- Previous version (8 October 2010).
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© 2010, Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
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