Can we justify eliminating coercive measures in psychiatry?
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The priority of the good on the just one
Prinsen and van Delden ask if we can justify eliminating coercive measures in psychiatry, because the practice of coercive measures in psychiatry is controversial. They say also that because there are conflict between autonomy and beneficence/non-maleficence, human dignity, the experiences of patients and the eff...
Asking “Can we justify eliminating coercive measures in psychiatry?” underscores the importance of paying attention to our moral and political presumptions and illustrates the social value and moral wickedness of psychiatry as a system of social control. The question implies that eliminating psychiatric deprivations of liberty needs to be justified but continuing to inflict such deprivations in the name of mental illness...