Article info
PDFNorman Daniels symposium
The multiple self objection to the prudential lifespan account
- Dr M Schefczyk, Universität St Gallen, Kulturwissenschaftliche Abteilung, Gatterstr 1, CH - 9010 St Gallen; michael.schefczyk{at}unisg.ch
Citation
The multiple self objection to the prudential lifespan account
Publication history
- Received January 11, 2008
- Accepted April 22, 2008
- First published December 22, 2008.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
Request permissions
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Copyright information
2009 BMJ Publishing Group & Institute of Medical Ethics
Other content recommended for you
- The harm principle, personal identity and identity-relative paternalism
- Are those who subscribe to the view that early embryos are persons irrational and inconsistent? A reply to Brock
- Life-extending enhancements and the narrative approach to personal identity
- Technological moral enhancement or traditional moral progress? Why not both?
- Critical notice—Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice by Francis J Beckwith
- A note on psychological continuity theories of identity and neurointerventions
- Too good for this world: moral bioenhancement and the ethics of making moral misfits
- Authority without identity: defending advance directives via posthumous rights over one’s body
- Ethics of care challenge to advance directives for dementia patients
- Infanticide and moral consistency