Article Text
Abstract
Multiple self approaches purport that to have equal concern about all stages of one’s life is not a requirement of rationality. This poses a challenge to the prudential lifespan account which Norman Daniels advocates in Just health: meeting health needs fairly. Daniels has criticised the multiple self approach in earlier works, most extensively in Am I my parents keeper? In Just health, he only takes up the issue except in one footnote, presumably because he is convinced that his preceding discussions settled the matter. This article argues that Daniels underestimates the force of the multiple self objection to prudential lifespan account.
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Footnotes
Competing interests: None.
↵i I am indebted to Dominique Kuenzle for this point.
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