Although the responsibility for health debate has intensified in several ways between Norman Daniels’ 1985 Just healthcare and Just health: meeting health needs fairly of 2008, comparatively little space is dedicated to the issue in Just health, and Daniels notes repeatedly that his account “says nothing about personal responsibility for health”.
Daniels considers health responsibility mainly in a particular luck-egalitarian version which he rejects because of its potentially unfeasible, penalising and inhumane character. But I show that he nonetheless acknowledges and endorses explicitly other dimensions of health responsibility.
I develop a wider, more nuanced and less punitive concept of health responsibility, which expands Daniels’ brief consideration and is compatible with the overall approach set out in Just health. In its application to preventative medicine and health promotion in particular, the concept is suited to support and complement the notion that “health is special”, which is central in Just health.
The concept of health responsibility as co-responsibility specifies the subjects and objects of health responsibilities. It permits the attribution of responsibility without blame and disconnects the question of assigning responsibility from decisions about entitlement to treatment or different status in prioritisation decisions. This approach secures conceptual plausibility and clarity of the concept of health responsibility, is of use in policy making, and can help reduce political tensions.
Statistics from Altmetric.com
If you wish to reuse any or all of this article please use the link below which will take you to the Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service. You will be able to get a quick price and instant permission to reuse the content in many different ways.
Competing interests: None declared.
The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone and must not be attributed to LSE Health or the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
↵i And one might add that under purely practical considerations it seems very difficult to find groups or clusters of people that are both sufficiently similar and sufficiently large, to describe meaningfully departures from some mean.
↵ii Note that the concept of co-responsibility also features in article 1 of the German Social Security Code (SGB V), although in a somewhat different and narrower sense, as responsibility for health is viewed as shared between the healthcare system and patients.
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Priority setting and personal health responsibility: an analysis of Norwegian key policy documents
- Feiring's concept of forward-looking responsibility: a dead end for responsibility in healthcare
- Personal responsibility for health as a rationing criterion: why we don’t like it and why maybe we should
- On the relevance of personal responsibility in priority setting: a cross-sectional survey among Norwegian medical doctors
- Personal responsibility for cardiac health: what are the ethical demands?
- A framework for luck egalitarianism in health and healthcare
- Voluntary sterilisation and access to IVF in Québec
- Personal responsibility for health: conceptual clarity, and fairness in policy and practice
- Prevention in the age of personal responsibility: epigenetic risk-predictive screening for female cancers as a case study
- Solidarity, justice and unconditional access to healthcare