Article Text
Abstract
Human reproductive cloning provides the possibility of genetically related children for persons for whom present technologies are ineffective. I argue that the desire for genetically related children is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to engage in human reproductive cloning. I show this by arguing that the value underlying the desire for genetically related children implies a tension between the parent and the future child. This tension stems from an instance of a deprivation and violates a general principle of reasons for deprivation. Alternative considerations, such as a right to procreative autonomy, do not appear helpful in making the case for human reproductive cloning merely on the basis of the desire for genetically related children.
Statistics from Altmetric.com
Read the full text or download the PDF:
Other content recommended for you
- Just another reproductive technology? The ethics of human reproductive cloning as an experimental medical procedure
- Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances?
- Emotional reactions to human reproductive cloning
- Reproductive cloning combined with genetic modification
- What exactly is an exact copy? And why it matters when trying to ban human reproductive cloning in Australia
- A resource-based version of the argument that cloning is an affront to human dignity
- Reproductive and therapeutic cloning, germline therapy, and purchase of gametes and embryos: comments on Canadian legislation governing reproduction technologies
- Embryonic stem cells: the disagreement debate and embryonic stem cell research in Israel
- Why the apparent haste to clone humans?
- How medical ethical principles are applied in treatment with artificial insemination by donors (AID) in Hunan, China: effective practice at the Reproductive and Genetic Hospital of CITIC-Xiangya