Article info
PDFReproductive ethics
Why two arguments from probability fail and one argument from Thomson’s analogy of the violinist succeeds in justifying embryo destruction in some situations
- Correspondence to: J Deckers Institute of Health and Society, The Medical School, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 4HH, UK; jan.deckers{at}ncl.ac.uk
Citation
Why two arguments from probability fail and one argument from Thomson’s analogy of the violinist succeeds in justifying embryo destruction in some situations
Publication history
- Received August 27, 2005
- Accepted October 20, 2005
- Revised October 16, 2005
- First published February 28, 2007.
Online issue publication
April 27, 2016
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Copyright information
Copyright 2007 by the Journal of Medical Ethics
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