Procreative beneficence and the prospective parent
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I would like to thank Professor Häyry for his complimentary remarks on my paper, and for his three (characteristically) incisive questions. In what follows, I will attempt to answer each of those questions in turn.
(i) Häyry asks how I can consistently maintain the conjunction of the following three propositions:
(a) taken together, the external and internal perspectives exhaust...
Peter Herissone-Kelly makes the case that it would be morally inappropriate for prospective parents to select their children based on comparative judgments about their life quality. This view is in stark contradiction with the view, advanced by Julian Savulescu , that parents have a moral obligation to select the best possible children they can have.
Herissone-Kelly argues that futu...